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IN SERVICE: 10-8
BC’s 2017 ILLICIT DRUG OVERDOSE STATS RELEASED
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has announced the 2017 statistics for illicit drug overdose deaths in the 
province. Last year there were 1,422 overdose deaths, almost a 43% increase over the same period in 
2016. Moreover, the report attributes Fentanyl laced drugs as accounting for the increase in deaths. In 
April 2017 alone, there were 151 deaths.  
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Upcoming Courses
Advanced Police Training
Advanced training provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for police 
officers. Training is offered in the areas of 
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for 
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.
JIBC Police Academy
See Course List here.
Note-able Quote
“Vision without action is hallucination. 
Action without vision is random activity.”
Unknown
“In Service: 10-8” is 
now in its 18th year of 
publication. We 
salute all of our 
readers and thank 
them for all that they 
do in maintaining 
public safety is this 
great nation.
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Co-occurring mental illness and substance use 
disorders: a guide to diagnosis and treatment.
edited by Jonathan D. Avery, John W. Barnhill.
Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association 
Publishing, 2018.
RC 564.68 C66 2018
Collecting qualitative data: a practical guide to 
textual, media and virtual techniques.
Virginia Braun, Victoria Clarke, Debra Gray.
Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press,  2017.
H 62 B715 2017
Critical inquiries for social justice in mental 
health.
edited by Marina Morrow and Lorraine Halinka 
Malcoe.
Toronto; Buffalo; London: University  of Toronto 
Press, 2017.
RA 790.5 C75 2017
DBT skills training manual.
Marsha M. Linehan.
New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2015.
RC 569.5 B67 L563 2015
Deception in the digital age: exploiting and 
defending human targets through computer-
mediated communications.
Cameron H. Malin, Terry Gudaitis, Thomas J. Holt, 
Max Kilger.
London; San Diego: Elsevier: Academic Press, 2017.
HV 8079 C65 M25 2017
The discussion book: 50 great ways to get people 
talking.
Stephen D. Brookfield and Stephen Preskill.
San Francisco, CA: John Wiley & Sons, 2016.
LC 6519 B75 2016
The fearless world of professional safety in the 
21st century.
Scott Gesinger.
Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2018.
T 55 G47 2018
The heart of coaching: using transformational 
coaching to create a high-performance coaching 
culture.
Thomas G. Crane with Lerissa Patrick.
San Diego, CA: FTA Press, 2017.
HF 5549.5 C53 C69 2017
In command of guardians: executive servant 
leadership for the community of responders.
Eric J. Russell; foreword by Roger E. Broomé.
Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017.
HM 1261 R87 2017
Managing public safety technology: deploying 
systems in police, courts, corrections, and fire 
organizations.
Jeffrey A. Rose, Donald C. Lacher.
New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017.
HV 675 R67 2017
The ostrich paradox: why we underprepare for 
disasters.
Robert Meyer and Howard Kunreuther.
Philadelphia, PA: Wharton Digital Press, 2017.
HD 49 M47 2017
Post-traumatic stress.
Stephen Regel, Centre for Trauma, Resilience and
Growth, Nottinghamshire Healthcare  NHS 
Foundation Trust and School of Education, University 
of Nottingham, UK, Stephen Joseph, Centre for 
Trauma, Resilience and Growth, Nottinghamshire 
Healthcare NHS Foundation Trust and School of 
Education, University of Nottingham, UK.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2017.
RC 552 P67 R44 2017
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FLEEING FROM ACCIDENT TO 
AVOID STOLEN AUTO CHARGE 
STILL HIT & RUN
R. v. Seipp, 2018 SCC 01 
Someone stole a car and other items 
during a break-in. The  victim of the 
b r e a k - i n d r o v e a r o u n d t h e 
neighbourhood in search of his stolen 
car. He saw the accused driving it, 
caught up to the car and tried to overtake it in a 
roundabout. The two vehicles collided and the 
accused fled the scene without providing either his 
name or address. Along with several offences 
related to the break-in, the accused was charged 
with failure to stop and provide his name and 
address at the scene of an accident under s. 252(1) 
of the Criminal Code. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused denied breaking into the 
home. Although he admitted to driving 
the car, he claimed that a friend of his 
unexpectedly stopped by his house and 
invited him to drive around in the car she had. He 
said he dropped his friend off and continued 
joyriding until the accident. He also testified that he 
fled from the collision because he suspected the 
car was stolen and therefore did not want to be 
present when the police arrived. The accused was 
nevertheless convicted on the hit and run charge 
despite the judge finding he did not cause the 
accident. He was also convicted of possessing a 
stolen vehicle, fraud and using a stolen debit card. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused appealed only  his 
hit and run conviction on the 
basis that an essential element 
of the hit and run charge 
required proof of “intent to escape criminal or civil 
liability.”  In his view, the proper interpretation of 
“escape civil or criminal liability”  is that the intent 
must relate to avoiding liability in connection with 
the cause of the accident rather than any liability 
arising  from the general operation of a motor 
vehicle. In this case, the accused testified he fled 
because  he did not want to be found with a stolen 
vehicle. Since the trial judge concluded that his 
driving was not the cause of the accident, the 
accused argued he did not leave the scene to 
escape civil or criminal liability in relation to the 
accident.
The Crown submitted that the intention to escape 
civil or criminal liability must be related to or 
substantially connected to the accident. In the 
Crown’s opinion, the accused fled the scene to 
evade liability  for driving a stolen car at the  time of 
the accident. Although his manner of driving did 
not cause the accident such that he could be held 
liable for any injuries, his use of the stolen car was 
a factual cause of the accident. This, the Crown 
contended, was a sufficient link  between the 
liability  he sought to avoid and the  collision to 
establish the mens rea for hit and run. 
The Court of Appeal found flight to avoid criminal 
liability  for driving a  vehicle knowing it was stolen 
also fit within the scale of liability connected to the 
accident. “The object of the Code offence is to 
provide a penal incentive for a  driver who is 
involved in an accident, regardless of whether they 
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal Code
Failure to stop at scene of accident
s. 252  (1)  Every person commits an offence 
who has the care, charge or control of a 
vehicle, vessel or aircraft that is involved in 
an accident with
(a) another person,
(b) a vehicle, vessel or aircraft, or
(c)  in the case of a vehicle, cattle in the charge of another 
person,
and with intent to escape civil or criminal liability fails to 
stop the vehicle, vessel or, if possible, the aircraft, give his 
or her name and address and, where any person has been 
injured or appears to require assistance, offer assistance.
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are at fault, to remain at the scene, provide their 
name and address, and offer assistance if another 
person appears to be injured or in need of 
assistance,”  said Justice Bennett. “The liability  a 
driver seeks to evade is not narrowly construed as 
solely arising from the consequences of the 
accident itself, but must also encompass offences 
connected to the driving, such as impaired driving, 
driving while suspended, criminal negligence, and 
dangerous driving.” 
      
In this case, “[the accused] did not want to be 
identified as the driver of the car, as he was 
knowingly in possession of a stolen automobile, 
and was driving it at the time he was involved in 
the accident,”  said Justice Bennett. “His flight from 
the scene was to avoid criminal liability  in 
connection with a vehicle he was driving at the 
time of the accident.” So, even if the accused’s 
explanation that he fled the scene to avoid being 
found in a stolen vehicle was accepted, the 
presumption of intent would not have been 
rebutted. The accused’s appeal was dismissed and 
his conviction was upheld. 
 
Supreme Court of Canada
A nine member panel of 
t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t 
rejected a further appeal 
by the accused. In a 
short oral judgement, 
Chief Justice Wagner, speaking for the full court, 
stated:
[The accused] had control of a vehicle involved 
in an accident. He fled the scene without 
providing his name or address. In the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, this was proof of 
the requisite intent for the offence.
  
The evidence on which [the accused] relies is 
that he fled the scene to avoid criminal 
liability for possession of a stolen vehicle. This 
is not evidence to the contrary. Rather, it is 
evidence that [the accused] intended to avoid 
criminal or civil liability from his care, charge, 
or control of the vehicle involved in the 
accident. Such an intent falls within the ambit 
of the mens rea established by the expression 
“intent to escape civil or criminal liability” in 
s. 252(1). 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.ca
 
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Seipp, 2015 BCCA 54
OFFICER’s COMMENTS DID NOT 
DENIGRATE COUNSEL
R. v. C.J.J., 2018 ABCA 7
A f t e r a s t e p f a t h e r f o u n d 
inappropriate text messages from the 
accused on his stepdaughter’s phone 
(victim 1), police were called. The 
accused was arrested by police and 
interviewed. The detective also had limited 
information about a conversation between the 
accused and another friend of victim 1. The 
accused was told of the charges related to victim 1 
only. He was not told he would be questioned 
about communications with anyone else. During 
the lengthy interview the police  focussed on the 
allegations involving victim 1. However, the 
accused was also asked six  questions about victim 
1 ’s f r i end s , i nc lud ing whe the r he had 
communicated with her friends by phone and what 
he would have texted them. He confirmed he 
communicated with one friend but otherwise said 
“The evidence on which [the accused] relies is that he fled the scene to avoid criminal liability for 
possession of a stolen vehicle. This is not evidence to the contrary. Rather, it is evidence that [the 
accused] intended to avoid criminal or civil liability from his care, charge, or control of the vehicle 
involved in the accident. Such an intent falls within the ambit of the mens rea established by the 
expression ‘intent to escape civil or criminal liability’ in s. 252(1).”
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he had no recollection. The detective also 
acknowledged during the interview that the 
accused had spoken to a lawyer and that his lawyer 
told him not to say anything. The detective also 
made a few comments about the accused’s lawyer’s 
advice:
• “And I understand that. I fully respect that. But 
I mean I don’t know what else you would 
expect them to say”.
• “Okay, but at the same time that person’s – 
that individual offering that advice isn’t sitting 
in your chair with you currently, right”?
• “I’m just going to remind you … that your 
lawyer’s not the one that’s sitting in this chair, 
facing these charges right now, okay? So if 
there’s a way for you to explain this to me, I’m 
a reasonable guy, okay? There’s nothing that 
says you have to walk out of here being 
charged with these offences”.
• In response to a  comment by the accused that 
the communications can be explained, and his 
lawyer will have the details: “well it’s 
unfortunate that we have to spend – that 
you’re going to have to spend that kind of 
money to, ah, get the truth out. But, hey, that’s 
– that’s your choice not mine”.
Eight days later the detective received substantially 
more information about the accused’s interactions 
with two more girls, friends of victim 1. Then, about 
two months later, the accused was arrested on 
offences related to the other two girls. This 
prompted several luring and sex related charges 
involving victim 1 and her two friends. They all 
between the ages of 13 and 15 years old. 
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The accused argued that his statement 
was not admissible as evidence because 
the police breached his ss. 10(a) and (b) 
Charter rights. First, he was not aware of 
his full jeopardy. The police had failed to inform 
him of all the reasons for his detention as it related 
to friends of victim 1. Second, the detective 
denigrated his lawyer’s advice such that it 
amounted to a s. 10(b) breach. 
The judge, however, admitted the accused’s 
statement. She found the focus of the  initial 
interview was on the serious charges related to the 
accused’s involvement with victim 1. Although a 
few questions were asked about contact with other 
friends, this line of questioning was dropped after 
the accused admitted to contact but could not 
remember the details. Nor was the accused 
charged with any  offences related to those friends 
until after further investigation some months later. 
As for the accused’s characterization that the 
detective’s statements were designed to undermine 
the accused’s confidence in and relationship with 
his counsel, the judge found there was no belittling 
of or denigration of the accused’s lawyer. In the 
judge’s view, the detective was simply pointing  out 
that the lawyer was not the one facing questions 
and that the detective was simply seeking  the 
accused’s side of the story. She concluded there 
was no evidence that these few comments did or 
would undermine the  accused’s confidence in his 
lawyer. The  accused was convicted of several 
counts of luring and other sex related offences. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
Among other things, the 
accused again argued that his 
rights under ss. 10(a) and (b) of 
t h e C h a r t e r h a d b e e n 
breached. He contended that  his statement to 
police should not have been admitted as evidence 
at trial. In his view, the investigator failed to inform 
him of all the reasons for his detention and the 
scope of his jeopardy, and failed to advise him of 
his right to counsel a second time when the 
investigation switched to a different offence. As 
well, he submitted that the interviewer breached 
his s. 10(b) rights by denigrating his lawyer’s advice.
Jeopardy
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge did not 
err in finding the accused’s s. 10(a) and (b) rights 
were not breached. The Appeal Court first noted:
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A change in the accused’s jeopardy arises 
where the investigation takes a new and more 
serious turn as events unfold, and the advice of 
counsel may no longer be adequate to the 
actual jeopardy that the accused faces. In such 
circumstances, the detainee must be given a 
further opportunity to consult with counsel 
and obtain advice on the new situation. 
[reference omitted, para. 24] 
However, the Court of Appeal recognized that “not 
every  exploratory question that touches on a 
different offence gives rise to a change in jeopardy 
that will require the police to reiterate an 
accused’s right to counsel.”  As for these 
circumstances, the initial interview dealt almost 
exclusively  with the accused’s relationship with 
victim 1. “The limited questioning regarding her 
friends was not explored in the initial interview,” 
said the Court of Appeal. “Charges with respect to 
the other complainants were laid two months 
later. This was not a change in jeopardy that 
warranted a reiteration of the [accused’s] right to 
counsel.” Thus, there was no s. 10(b) Charter 
violation. 
Denigration of Counsel 
In R.  v. Burlingham, [1995] 2 SCR 206, the 
Supreme Court of Canada stated:
… s. 10(b) specifically prohibits the police… 
from belittling an accused’s lawyer with the 
express goal or effect of undermining the 
accused’s confidence in and relationship with 
defence counsel. It makes no sense for s 10(b) 
of the Charter to provide for the right to retain 
and instruct counsel if law enforcement 
authorities are able to undermine either an 
accused’s confidence in his or her lawyer or 
the solicitor-client relationship. 
In this case, the Court of Appeal noted that the 
comments in Burlington said to denigrate  the 
integrity  of defence counsel were described as 
“repeated disparaging comments made about 
defence counsel’s loyalty, commitment, availability, 
as well as the amount of his legal fees”.  But here, 
the trial found that the comments made by the 
detective did not rise  to the  same level of 
denigrating counsel so as to constitute a breach of 
the accused’s s. 10 rights. The trial judge did not err 
in rejecting the accused’s characterization that the 
detective’s statements were designed to undermine 
the accused’s confidence in and relationship with 
his counsel. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
REASONABLE GROUNDS NOT 
TO BE DETERMINED IN ‘LEGAL 
LABORATORY’
R. v. Bui, 2018 ABCA 62
 
Two confidential informants told a 
police officer that an Asian male, 
larger in stature, was dealing cocaine. 
B o t h i n f o r m a n t s p r o v i d e d a 
description of the suspect’s car (a Nissan Ultima) 
and license plate number. Though the officer relied 
mainly on the informants’ handlers in assessing the 
reliability of the information, he knew that both 
informants were registered with this police 
department and, therefore, had undergone 
background checks to exclude individuals with a 
history of treachery or lying to police.
The officer ran the license plate number through 
the motor vehicle database. The license plate 
matched a 2012 white Nissan Altima registered to 
the accused. The database also provided the 
accused’s address and a  general physical 
description of him, which confirmed the accused 
“A change in the accused’s jeopardy arises where the investigation takes a new and more serious 
turn as events unfold, and the advice of counsel may no longer be adequate to the actual 
jeopardy that the accused faces. In such circumstances, the detainee must be given a further 
opportunity to consult with counsel and obtain advice on the new situation.”
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was of Asian descent. Over a four day period, two 
notable transactions were observed while the 
police monitored the accused’s car and address. 
On the first day, the accused drove directly from his 
residence to a parking lot where an individual 
jogged up to the car and entered. A minute later, 
the individual exited the car and jogged to a nearby 
apartment building. The accused immediately 
drove away and returned to his residence. On the 
last day of surveillance, a very similar interaction 
occurred. The accused again drove directly from his 
residence to the same location. Upon arrival, an 
individual entered the car and interacted with the 
accused for about 30 seconds before returning to 
the building from which he came.
On this second occasion, the officer directed the 
accused’s arrest. A search of his vehicle upon arrest 
revealed four packages of powdered cocaine, four 
packages of crack cocaine, two cell phones, and 
$830 cash. No other drug paraphernalia was found 
in the car. Police then secured and executed a 
search warrant at the accused’s residence where 
significant quantities of cocaine and paraphernalia 
for wholesale trafficking was found.
Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench
The judge found that s. 495(1)(a) of the 
Criminal Code authorizes an arrest as 
long as the arresting officer subjectively 
believes there are reasonable and 
probable grounds on which to base the arrest and 
those grounds are justifiable from an objective 
point of view. The judge, in assessing the grounds 
for arrest, concluded that the confidential informant 
information, combined with the surveillance 
observations and the officer’s extensive experience, 
was su f f i c ien t to g round the ob jec t ive 
reasonableness for his subjective belief.
As for the search warrant of the accused’s 
residence, the  judge found the authorizing justice 
could have issued it. There were no inaccuracies, 
omissions, misleading statements or inappropriate 
inferences made by the affiant. The information 
about the informants addressed the currency and 
reliability of their tips, and the ITO noted where 
specific information was independently verifiable. 
And, even though the information did not expressly 
mention that a  lack of drug paraphernalia found in 
the accused's vehicle was a reason to suspect that 
evidence of a drug crime would be found in the 
accused’s home, the judge concluded that he was 
entitled to take into account the reasonable 
inferences available from the evidence. There were 
no Charter  breaches and the accused was 
convicted of possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime.
Alberta Court of Appeal 
The accused argued that the 
arresting officer did not have 
reasonable and probable 
grounds for arresting him. 
Further, the evidence discovered in the car upon 
arrest, if excised from the information to obtain the 
warrant, would result in insufficient evidence to 
support the  search warrant. In his opinion, his rights 
under ss. 8 (search and seizure) and 9 (arbitrary 
detention) of the Charter were breached. 
Arrest
The accused conceded that the  officer directing the 
arrest subjectively had the necessary grounds. 
However, he argued that these grounds were not 
objectively reasonable. In his opinion, the  police 
observations of the two suspected transactions were 
insufficient since the police never actually observed 
any hand-to-hand exchange of drugs. He claimed 
that the officer did not independently confirm the 
informants’ rel iabil i ty and did not have 
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal Code
Arrest without warrant by peace 
officer
s. 495 (1) A peace officer may arrest without 
warrant
(a) a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he believes has 
committed or is about to commit an indictable offence...
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confirmation that the accused was the Asian male 
to whom the informants referred. As such, the 
informants’ information could not be  used to 
bolster the objective reasonableness of the grounds 
for arrest. 
The Court of Appeal, however, disagreed. “A court 
assessing the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest 
must not apply the governing principles as if they 
were constructed for application in a legal 
laboratory,” said the Court of Appeal. “In 
evaluating the lawfulness of an arrest under s. 
495(1)(a) of the Criminal Code a court must ask if 
there are objectively verifiable facts that would 
have caused a  reasonable person with the training 
and experience of the arrestor and who was aware 
of the information that caused the officer to make 
the arrest to conclude that the  likelihood the 
arrestee committed a  specific indictable offence 
was approaching the  more-likely-than-not point on 
the scale of certainty.”
In this case, an objective observer in the officer’s 
shoes would have considered:
• Two separate informants had reported that an 
Asian male driving  a Nissan Altima with a 
specific license plate was selling cocaine; 
• These  informants were registered with the 
police – meaning they had undergone 
background checks to exclude individuals 
with a history of treachery or lying to police – 
and were considered credible by  the two 
experienced officers acting as their handlers;
• The license plate  number provided by the 
informants matched the described car; 
• The accused was the registered owner of this 
car and broadly  matched the physical 
description provided by the informants; 
• On two occasions, officers observed the 
accused briefly interact with another person in 
a manner consistent with the way in which the 
officer had interacted with drug sellers when 
working as an undercover operative; and
• The officer’s knowledge, training and 
experience were also significant factors.
“Noncriminal aspects of an informants’ 
information which are corroborated by 
observation can be considered as part of ‘the 
totality of the circumstances’ forming reasonable 
grounds,” said the Appeal Court. “Further, the 
police  need not ‘confirm each detail in an 
informant’s tip so long as the sequence of events 
actually observed conforms sufficiently to the 
anticipated pattern to remove the possibility of 
innocent coincidence’. In this case, the 
confidential informants’ information combined 
with the surveillance observations of the two 
transactions – which [the officer] believed to be 
drug transactions based on his significant prior 
experience – removed the possibility  of innocent 
coincidence.”
Moreover, this was not a case where the police 
were dealing with a single anonymous informant. 
Rather, the information came from two known 
informants, both of whom were registered with the 
police. As well, there was evidence of the 
“A court assessing the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest must not apply the governing 
principles as if they were constructed for application in a legal laboratory.”
“Noncriminal aspects of an informants’ information which are corroborated by 
observation can be considered as part of ‘the totality of the circumstances”
Officer’s Experience
The officer was an experienced police officer with over 10 
years of experience in various roles tied to drug 
enforcement. He was a member of the Drug and Gang 
Enforcement Team and had received training, certification, 
and experience in covert surveillance and undercover 
operations for drug investigations. He had observed how 
drug transactions occur in real-time both as an operator 
making drug purchases and during surveillance of confirmed 
drug transactions. 
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informants’ reliability both from their handlers and 
from some corroboration of the information they 
provided.
The trial judge made no error in his determination 
on the reasonable grounds standard being met. The 
totality  of the confidential informant information, 
surveillance observations and the officer’s 
experience satisfied the objective reasonableness of 
the officer’s subjective belief. 
Search Warrant
The accused also contended that, even if the arrest 
was based on reasonab le g rounds , the 
circumstances of the surveillance and the 
information to obtain were insufficient to connect 
any alleged drug activity  to his residence. In his 
submission, the lack of drug paraphernalia in his 
vehicle was a factor connecting the drug activity  to 
his residence but it was not mentioned as one of 
the affiant’s considerations in the information to 
obtain.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the  trial judge 
applied the  proper test in determining whether the 
search warrant was properly granted:
The trial judge gave considerable thought to the 
defence submission that the evidence only 
supported an inference of drug activity 
confined to the [accused’s] vehicle. He fairly 
characterized the links to the [accused’s] 
residence as secondary, but noted the 
significance of the [accused] driving directly 
from his residence to the location where the 
transactions occurred without any intermediate 
stops. He observed that, for both transactions, 
the same pattern was apparent with the 
[accused] leaving his residence, travelling 
directly to the same location, and conducting a 
brief transaction with an unknown individual. 
The trial judge further observed that the 
authorizing justice had evidence of the 
[accused] regularly parking his vehicle at the 
residence and being seen taking items into the 
residence. [para. 21]
There were no ss. 8 or 9 Charter violations and the 
accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ACCUSED EITHER HAS 
STANDING, OR NOT
R. v. Vickerson, 2018 BCCA 39
The accused was the target of a police 
investigation into drug trafficking. Two 
confidential informants told police that 
“Conrad” or “JT” (a known nickname 
of the accused) was selling drugs from 
his house. One of the informants had purchased 
drugs from him, and had seen drugs inside his 
house. Police conducted surveillance on the 
accused’s home over a two month period and 
observed a number of people arriving, staying a few 
minutes and then leaving. On one occasion, they 
observed a truck arrive at the accused's residence 
and stop outside. A male from the truck  (Mr. 
Schnarr) entered the accused’s home, stayed for six 
minutes, got back into the truck and it drove away. 
The police stopped the truck and arrested its two 
occupants including Schnarr, a passenger. When 
asked by the arresting officer whether he had any 
weapons or drugs on him, Schnarr said he had 
drugs hidden in his crotch. Schnarr was 
handcuffed, read his Charter rights and transported 
to the police station where  he was searched. Police 
found seven 0.5 gram bags of cocaine. As well, 
police searched Schnarr’s mobile phone and found 
a series of text messages between Schnarr and “JT”, 
along with cal l logs showing two short 
conversations between Schnarr and “JT” in the hour 
proceeding Schnarr’s visit to the accused’s 
residence. 
The information from the confidential informants, 
the surveillance, and the evidence from Schnarr’s 
arrest provided the  grounds for a telewarrant to 
search the accused’s home. When the police 
executed the search warrant, they arrested the 
accused and conducted a search of his person, his 
vehicle and his residence. As a result of their 
search, the police found cash, cocaine, MDMA, 
BZP and TFMPP, plastic baggies, empty pill 
capsules, a score sheet, pipes containing 
marihuana residue, a marihuana grinder, and glass 
pipes.
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British Columbia Provincial Court
The accused sought a voir dire to 
determine the validity of the  warrant and 
applied to have the evidence excluded. 
Among other things, the judge found the 
accused did not display a reasonable likelihood 
that the evidence from the confidential informants 
or the police observations would be excluded. 
Thus, there was no need to declare a voir dire 
regarding these issues. However, the judge 
declared a voir dire with respect to the evidence 
obtained through the  search of the truck that left 
the accused’s residence and was stopped by police. 
On this issue, the accused argued that the the 
police did not have reasonable grounds to stop the 
truck, and arrest and search its occupants. He 
contended that the evidence of the seven 0.5 gram 
bags of cocaine, and the information on the mobile 
phone related to the alias “JT”, was collected in 
violation of s.  8 of the Charter and should be 
excluded. 
The judge found the  arrest of Schnarr, the truck’s 
occupant, lawful. The police had subjective and 
objective  reasonable grounds to arrest the 
occupants of the truck based on the lead 
investigator’s observations of the comings and 
goings to the accused’s house during the 
investigation, which was informed by her 
e x p e r i e n c e i n ove r 1 0 0 C D S A - r e l a t e d 
investigations. The seven 0.5-gram bags of cocaine 
found on Schnarr as an incident to arrest were 
obtained in compliance with s. 8 of the Charter  and 
were therefore admissible and could be included in 
the ITO.  And, even if the search of Schnarr was 
unlawful, the judge found the accused had no 
standing to raise a Charter issue respecting this 
evidence. 
The text messages and call logs between Schnarr 
and the accused, however, were excluded and 
expunged from the ITO. In the judge’s view, the 
accused retained a privacy interest in the 
“electronic communications”, referring to the  text 
messages and call log information located on 
Schnarr’s mobile phone. The judge inferred that the 
accused had a subjective expectation of privacy 
and found that he had a right to privacy even 
though the arrest of Schnarr (the mobile phone’s 
owner) was lawful. Nevertheless, the judge ruled 
there were sufficient grounds to support the 
warrant. Since the warrant was lawful, there was no 
need to conduct a s.  24(2) Charter  analysis. The 
accused was convicted on four counts of 
possessing illicit drugs for the purpose of trafficking. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused contended, in 
part, that he  had standing to 
challenge the grounds for the 
arrest and search of Schnarr (a 
third party) and that any  evidence obtained as a 
result of the unlawful search should be excluded 
under s. 24(2) of the Charter. In his view, the trial 
judge erred by determining, after a voir dire, that 
the accused did not have standing to challenge the 
admissibility of evidence obtained in the 
unreasonable search of Schnarr. Furthermore, if the 
accused did have standing, he submitted that the 
judge erred in finding that the police had 
reasonable grounds to stop, arrest, and search 
Schnarr and admit into evidence the drugs found. 
As well, he asserted that the text messages and call 
logs, which the trial judge found were unlawfully 
obtained, ought to have led to the exclusion of all 
of the evidence under s. 24(2). 
The Crown, on the other hand, argued that the 
accused had no standing to challenge the  arrest 
and search of Schnarr, nor the search of the vehicle 
he was in. And, even if the accused did have 
standing, the  Crown suggested that Schnarr’s arrest 
and search were lawful anyways. The Crown also 
argued that the trial judge erred in excluding the 
evidence of the mobile phone text messages found 
in Schnarr’s telephone.
Standing
“A person is granted standing to challenge a 
search and seizure in a criminal case when they 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy,” said 
Justice Bennett, writing the unanimous Court of 
Appeal decision. “The factual matrix is all-
important when assessing a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.”  In this case, the  accused was 
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challenging the search of Schnarr and the seizure of 
drugs, text messages and call logs pursuant to that 
search. He even asserted that he should have been 
able to challenge all aspects of the searches as he 
had at least “partial standing” based on the search 
of the cellphone. But this partial standing notion 
was rejected:
Either one has standing or not. The standing 
analysis is founded on a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the thing searched or 
seized. Standing to challenge the contents of a 
mobile phone does not translate into standing 
to challenge searches or seizures where there 
is no expectation of privacy. [para. 48]
Here, there  was nothing to support the accused’s 
submission that he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy respecting the search of the vehicle, the 
arrest and search of Schnarr or the seizure of drugs 
and the mobile phone. The accused was not 
present when the vehicle was stopped and 
searched, he was not in possession or control of the 
vehicle, he did not own the property, nor was there 
any evidence he had an attachment to the property. 
As for the search of the mobile phone and the 
discovery of the text messages, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the trial judge misapplied the law 
respecting the privacy interest the sender of a text 
message may have in the message in the  phone of 
its recipient:
The trial judge’s holding that [the accused] had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in text 
messages sent to a third party’s mobile phone 
is grounded in his reading of Pelucco. In his 
voir dire ruling, the trial judge read Pelucco to 
“stand for the proposition [sic] the court must 
infer that the sender of a message has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy” with 
respect to messages found in the search of a 
third party’s mobile phone, and thus he 
excluded the evidence of the text messages 
without any further analysis. [para. 51]
Although a majority of the Court of Appeal in R. v. 
Pelucco, 2015BCCA 370 found a  “a sender will 
ordinarily have a reasonable expectation that a 
text message will remain private in the hands of its 
recipient,” whether a sender of a text message has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in a received 
message depends on the total i ty of the 
circumstances. As a result, “Pelucco does not stand 
for the proposition that the sender of a text 
message always has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy  in that text message as stored on its 
recipient’s mobile phone.” This is consistent, Justice 
Bennett noted, with the recent Supreme Court of 
Canada decision of R. v. Marakah, 2017 SCC 59 
where  the majority stated, “depending on the 
totality of the circumstances, text messages that 
have been sent and received may in some cases be 
protected under s. 8.”
Moreover, the holding in Pelucco was inapplicable 
to situations where the police conduct a lawful 
search. In this case, the trial judge found Schnarr’s 
arrest lawful. However, rather than considering 
whether the search of the  mobile phone was a 
lawful search incidental to arrest, he found a 
breach simply because the accused had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Although the 
accused had standing to challenge the search of 
Schnarr’s mobile phone, the trial judge failed to 
consider whether this was a valid search incidental 
to arrest. Whether or not the search of Schnarr’s 
mobile phone was lawful as an incident to arrest 
did not need to be answered. The  trial judge 
excluded the evidence of the text messages and the 
call logs from the ITO based on his misapplication 
of Pelucco, a decision that favoured the accused 
and therefore did not assist the accused on this 
appeal. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“Either one has standing or not. The standing analysis is founded on a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the thing searched or seized. Standing to challenge the contents 
of a mobile phone does not translate into standing to challenge searches or seizures 
where there is no expectation of privacy.”
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STANDARD CAUTION 
QUESTION BREACHED POLICE 
DUTY TO HOLD-OFF
R. v G.T.D., 2018 SCC 7
The accused was arrested for the sexual 
assault of his previous intimate partner. 
When he was arrested by police, an 
officer read the standard caution to him 
on the street. The officer informed the accused of 
his right to speak with a lawyer, the availability of 
free duty counsel, and the option of applying to 
Legal Aid:
The accused stated he understood and when asked 
if he wished to speak to a lawyer, the accused 
responded by stating that he wanted to consult 
counsel. The police  then read a further standard 
caution. He was told:
The accused then immediately responded, “Yeah. 
Like a boss says I’m raping, I didn’t do because I 
was thinking, like, since we are in a relationship, 
it’s okay. I didn’t think it would be a raping because 
we our two boys together.” The accused was 
transported to the police station where he called a 
lawyer. 
Alberta Provincial Court
The officer testified he read the text of 
the two cautions, which had been 
provided by his police department, in 
accordance with his training. The judge 
found there was no Charter breach respecting the 
accused’s right to counsel. And, even if there was a 
breach, it was minor and the accused’s statement 
was nevertheless admissible. The officer acted in 
good faith in reading the standard caution, there 
was minimal impact on the accused’s rights, and 
the admission of this spontaneous and voluntary 
statement would not bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. The accused was convicted 
of sexual assault. 
Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused argued that once 
he indicated he wished to 
consult counsel, the police 
officer had an implementational 
duty  under the Charter to hold off on any questions 
until he was given a chance to do so. In asking the 
question, “Do you wish to say anything?”, the 
accused asserted the officer breached s. 10(b). 
After reviewing the historical context of the police 
caution, a majority of the Court of Appeal found 
the positive  question (“Do you wish to say 
anything?”) breached the accused’s right to 
counsel. Under s. 10(b), the Court of Appeal 
recognized there were three duties imposed on the 
police when arresting or detaining an accused:
1. to inform the detainee of their right to retain and 
instruct counsel without delay and of the 
existence and availability  of legal aid and duty 
counsel (INFORMATIONAL);
2. if a detainee has indicated a desire to exercise 
this right, to provide the detainee with a 
reasonable opportunity to exercise the right 
(except in urgent and dangerous circumstances) 
(IMPLEMENTATIONAL); and
3. to refrain from eliciting evidence from the 
detainee until they have had that reasonable 
opportunity (except in cases of urgency or 
danger) (IMPLEMENTATIONAL).
You may be charged with sexual assault and 
breach. You are not obliged to say anything 
unless you wish to do so, but whatever you say 
may be given in evidence. Do you wish to say 
anything?
I am arresting you for sexual assault and breach 
of a recognizance. You have the right to retain 
and instruct a lawyer without delay. This means 
that before we proceed with our investigation, 
you may call any lawyer you wish or a lawyer 
from a free legal advice service immediately. If 
you want to call a lawyer from a free legal 
advice service, we will provide you with a 
telephone, and you can call a toll free number 
for immediate legal advice. If you wish to 
contact any other lawyer, a telephone and 
telephone books will be provided to you. If you 
are charged with an offence, you may apply to 
Legal Aid for assistance.
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In this case, asking the question (“Do you wish to 
say anything?”) after the accused had asserted a 
desire  to contact counsel breached the third duty to 
“refrain from eliciting evidence”. Even though the 
officer had no expectation that the accused would 
say anything at all and had no intention of 
following up if the accused remained silent, the 
question nonetheless amounted to a  breach. “Once 
the detained person asks to speak to counsel, the 
implementational duty on the police is to ‘refrain 
from eliciting evidence’,” said majority. “If nothing 
else, this wording risks prompting an incriminating 
response before the accused has had an 
opportunity to consult counsel. If this caution is to 
be used, the alternative ending ‘Do you 
understand?’ is the one that is consistent with the 
Charter.”  Despite the finding of a Charter breach, 
the majority would have admitted the accused’s 
statement under s. 24(2). His appeal from 
conviction was dismissed. 
Justice Veldhuis, in dissent, agreed the 
accused’s s. 10(b) right had been 
violated. In her view, the open-ended 
question (“Do you wish to say 
anything?”) breached the police duty to hold off 
eliciting evidence. “The officer concluded by 
asking the [accused] whether he wanted to say 
anything,” said Justice Veldhuis. “Many, if not 
most, detainees would treat this concluding 
question as the arresting officer’s invitation to 
respond to the allegations that led to their arrest.” 
She would, however, have excluded the accused’s 
statement as evidence, set aside his conviction and 
ordered a new trial. 
Supreme Court of Canada
The accused again 
appealed arguing that 
his statement ought to 
have been excluded 
as evidence. A five 
member panel of the Supreme Court of Canada all 
agreed that the question (“Do you wish to say 
anything?”) breached the  accused’s s. 10(b) Charter 
right. “The right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the 
Charter obliges police to ‘hold off from attempting 
to elicit incriminatory evidence from the detainee 
How the courtroom questioning went
Q: … So you understood that he wanted to speak to a lawyer?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Which was his right upon detention, right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So your obligation was then to take him to a telephone at 
the station so he could make a call, right?
A:  That’s correct, sir, yes.
Q:  Not question him any further, right?
A:  That’s correct, sir, and I did not.
Q: Well, you did. You asked him if he wanted to say something.
A: Well, I read the -- the standard caution, sir.
Q: Right. And it concluded with what words, the standard 
caution?
A: It concluded with: Do you wish to say anything? ...
Q:   So your question, Do you want to say anything, I suggest 
was improper in the circumstances. Is that not your 
understanding of the law?
A: No, sir. In my experience and -- and by training, this -- the 
Charter Right to Counsel is read and then the standard caution 
is read, and then the replies are noted. I did not question [the 
accused].
Q: Well, you did. You said, Do you want to say anything?
A: Okay.
Q: That’s a question, right?
A: I acknowledge, sir, that that is a question and that is printed 
in the standard caution which has been my practice for ten 
years to read after the Charter Right to Counsel.
Q: But once the person says they want to speak to a lawyer -- 
… -- what is your obligation at that point? Are you able to 
continue questioning him or --
A:  No, sir.
Q:  -- is your obligation to take him to a phone?
A: And I did so, sir, yes. As soon as I took him to the station, he 
was given access to a working telephone.
Q:   But you did question him before he was given access to a 
phone?
A:  Okay. Are you asking if I ask -- if I read the standard 
caution, which I did.
Q: And then you said, Do you want to say anything?
A: Which is part of the standard caution, sir.
Q:  Well, it is a question put to the accused, right?
A: Which is printed here which is -- from my training and my 
experience, what I do.
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until he or she has had a reasonable opportunity 
to reach counsel’,” said Justice Brown in a short 
oral judgment. Asking, “Do you wish to say 
anything?”, at the  conclusion of the standard 
caution used by the police after the accused had 
already invoked his right to counsel, violated the 
police duty to “hold off” because it elicited a 
statement from the accused.
The Supreme Court, however, was 
divided on whether the breach in this 
case  warranted the exclusion of the 
accused’s statement. Four justices found 
the statement should be excluded, substantially for 
the reasons of Justice Veldhuis at the Alberta Court 
of Appeal. The majority  of the Supreme Court 
therefore  excluded the accused‘s statement, 
allowed the accused’s appeal and ordered a  new 
trial.
Chief Justice  Wagner, on the other hand, would 
have dismissed the appeal on the basis that the 
breach did not warrant the exclusion of the 
accused’s statement. In his view, the question was 
accompanied by clear information about the 
accused’s choice to speak to the police which 
attenuated the  impact of the state conduct on the 
accused’s Charter-protected interests and the 
admission of the statement would not bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.
Complete case available at www.scc-csc.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
G.T.D., 2017 ABCA 274.
EXTERNAL LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES
11th National Symposium on Tech Crime and 
Electronic Evidence         
March 2, 2018 
Online Replay
Click here.
Courtroom Testimony: A Practical Skills 
Workshop for Police and Other Law 
Enforcement Professionals
March 2, 2018 
In Person and Webcast 
Click here.
11th Annual Intensive Course on Drafting and 
Reviewing Search Warrants
March 5, 2018 
In Person and Webcast 
Click here.
3rd National Symposium on Mental Disorder: 
Criminal Justice and Community Solutions
March 29, 2018 
Join a top tier, multi-disciplinary faculty to explore the 
transformation of the criminal justice system and 
innovative community solutions in relation to mentally ill 
offenders.
Online Replay
Click here.
National Symposium on Criminal Sexual 
Assault
April 21, 2018
An allegation of sexual assault  raises  unique challenges for 
lawyers, judges and investigators. In recent years, the 
justice  system’s handling of these cases has come under 
sustained scrutiny. Positive outcomes in sexual offence 
cases are contingent on good education and best 
practices.
In Person and Webcast 
Click here.
“Either one has standing or not. The 
standing analysis is founded on a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
thing searched or seized. Standing to 
challenge the contents of a mobile 
phone does not translate into standing 
to challenge searches or seizures where 
there is no expectation of privacy.”
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
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ILLICT DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS IN 2017
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug overdose deaths in the 
province from January 1, 2017 to December 31, 
2017. In December there were 99 suspected drug 
overdose deaths. This represents a 40% decrease 
over the number of deaths occurring in December 
2016. This amounts to about three (3) people  dying 
every day of the month in December.
Despite the December decline in deaths, there 
were a total of 1,422 illicit drug overdose deaths in 
2017. This is a  43% increase over the same period 
last year.
The 1,422 overdose deaths last year amounted to 
more than a 327% over 2013. Moreover, the report 
attributes fentanyl laced drugs as accounting for the 
increase in deaths. 
People aged 30-39 were the hardest hit in 2017 
with 392 illicit drug  overdose deaths followed by 
40-49 year-olds at 334 deaths and 50-59 year-olds 
at 286 deaths. Vancouver had the most deaths at 
358 followed by Surrey (174), Victoria (91), 
Kelowna (75), Nanaimo (51) and Abbotsford (40). 
Males continue to die at almost a 5:1 ratio 
compared to females. In 2017, 1,173 males had 
died while there were 249 female deaths.
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The data  indicates that most illicit drug overdose 
deaths (87.8%) occurred inside while 11.4% 
occurred outside. For eleven (11) deaths, the 
location was unknown. 
“Private residence” includes residences, driveways, 
garages, trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
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DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 21 months preceding the 
declaration (Jul 2014-Mar 2016) 
totaled 921. The  number of deaths 
in the  21 months following the 
declaration (April 2016-Dec 
2017) totaled 2,193. This is 
an increase of 138%.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top four detected drugs relevant to illicit drug 
overdose deaths from 2016 and 2017 were 
fentanyl, which was detected in 70.1% of deaths, 
cocaine (47.5%), methamphetamine/amphetamine 
(33.1%), and heroin (30.7%). 
In 2017, fentanyl was detected in 81% (1,156) of 
illicit drug overdose deaths. In 2016 fentanyl was 
detected in 670 deaths, or 67%.
According to Vancouver Coastal Health, drugs 
users at Insite  - a supervised injection site - checked 
their drugs more than 1,400 times from July 2016 
to July 2017. Overall, 80% of the drugs checked 
were positive for fentanyl, including 84% of heroin 
samples and 65%  of non-opiate drugs like crystal 
meth and cocaine.
Sources: 
-Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths in BC - January 1, 2007 to December 
31, 2017.  
-Fentanyl Detected Illicit Drug Overdose Deaths, January 1, 2012 to 
December 31, 2017. 
Ministry of Justice, Office of the Chief Coroner. December 11, 2017.
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OPIOID awareness in Canada
Opioids are typically pain medications, mostly available by prescription.  Some of
the most commonly known opioids are fentanyl, OxyContin, morphine and codeine.
Source: Survey on Opioid Awareness, 2017 
Level of Awareness
by province or
territory
Somewhat
aware
Very
aware
Not at all 
aware
www.canada.ca/opioids
For further information on opioids, please visit the following website:
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left-over opioids being stored in the home.
Fentanyl is a medication used to relieve pain that is about 100 times 
more potent than morphine
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an opioid overdose, however, the results are temporary
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3 in 10 Canadians aged 18 and over 
reported using some form of opioid in the 
past 5 years.
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EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
W h e n c o n s i d e r i n g w h e t h e r 
eyewitness identification of an 
accused has been proven, a  court will 
consider the following factors:
• knowledge of the accused where the person 
identified was a stranger or witness;
• whether the circumstances of the identification 
are conducive to accurate identification, such as 
whether the witness had a clear view, lighting 
etc.;
• whether pre-trial identification processes, such as 
a photo-lineup, were flawed;
• whether there was other evidence tending to 
confirm or support the identification evidence; 
and
• whether the witness had a bias. (R. v. O’Keefe, 
2018 NLCA 11)
APPEAL COURT HAS NO 
JURISDICTION TO STAY DNA 
ORDER
British Columbia’s top court has ruled 
that it has no power to stay a DNA 
order pending the  disposition of an 
appeal. The accused had been 
convicted of aggravated assault and 
was sentenced to 18 months’ incarceration. The 
sentencing judge also ordered the accused provide 
a DNA sample under s. 487.051 of the Criminal 
Code  because aggravated assault is a primary 
designated offence. When the accused filed an 
appeal against his conviction and sentence he 
wanted the DNA order stayed pending the outcome 
of his appeal. 
A unanimous British Columbia Court of Appeal, 
however, ruled it did not have the jurisdiction to 
stay the DNA order since there was no specific 
power given to a court to grant the stay requested 
in this case. “In my view, a stay of a  DNA order 
does not constitute  the kind of ancillary  or 
incidental order that the  Court is empowered to 
make under the Court of Appeal Act,” said Justice 
Fisher. “This is a provincial statute that cannot 
confer substantive jurisdiction on the Court or on 
a single justice  in criminal matters.”  (R. v. Kaplan, 
2018 BCCA 31)
DESIRE FOR PRIVACY 
DIFFERENT THAN EXPECTATION 
OF PRIVACY
Two accused drug makers obtained 
possession of a secluded residential 
property by means of an elaborate 
fraud. They  payed a substantial 
premium to ensure  there was no 
paper trail connecting them to the property. They 
then immediately converted the property to a meth 
lab. When the police executed a search warrant at 
the house, the  two accused tried to flee but were 
arrested. The house was contaminated and had to 
be destroyed. 
Both accused tried to have the evidence excluded 
at their trial, arguing their rights under s. 8 of the 
Charter had been breached. Ontario’s highest 
court, however, upheld a trial judge’s ruling that the 
accused did not have a reasonable  expectation of 
privacy in the house  and therefore no standing to 
argue a s. 8 breach. Their connection to the 
property was tenuous. They obtained the house by 
fraud and did not use  it as a residence. Instead, 
they used it as a meth lab. Further, they did not 
have the legal right to admit or exclude  others. One 
of the  accused even said that if someone arrived 
and insisted on staying and calling the police, he 
would have fled. 
“‘Expectation’ can be ambiguous between two 
meanings, only one of which is relevant to s. 8 
analysis,” said the Court of Appeal. “In the first 
sense, a person has an expectation of privacy 
where he desires privacy and believes it is unlikely, 
as a matter of fact, that he will be disturbed. In the 
second sense, a  person has an expectation of 
privacy  where she believes she will be  undisturbed 
because she is entitled to be left undisturbed. In s. 
8 jurisprudence, subjective  expectation is used in 
this latter sense.” (R. v. Van Duong, 2018 ONCA 
115) 
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